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 Abstract
This paper provides evidence for a signiﬁcant relation between international
ﬁnancial markets’ integration and output volatility. In the framework of a
threshold model, it is shown empirically that this relation depends on coun-
try’s ﬁnancial risk. Financial risk indicates a country’s ability to pay its
oﬃcial, commercial and trade debts. In countries with low ﬁnancial risk, ﬁ-
nancial openness decreases output volatility, while, in countries with high
ﬁnancial risk, ﬁnancial openness increases output volatility. Extensive ro-
bustness checks conﬁrm this result.
Keywords: output volatility; ﬁnancial openness; ﬁnancial risk
JEL classiﬁcation: E32, F36, F41Non-technical summary
With the negative eﬀects of output volatility in mind, politicians have to
decide on the extent of their countries’ ﬁnancial integration. However, there
is still no consensus among researchers on whether and how ﬁnancial openness
aﬀects output volatility.
I hypothesize that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on output volatility de-
pends on ﬁnancial risk. In the context of this paper, ﬁnancial risk approxi-
mates a country’s ability to pay its debts and to stabilize its exchange rate.
These are the types of risk an investor considers when investing in a country.
It is hypothesized that, in the case of low-risk countries, investors buy more
equity during recessions because even those ﬁrms with good future prospects
are relatively cheap. Furthermore, they lend money to prospering projects
which domestic banks might not be able to ﬁnance. Therefore, international
capital inﬂows are counter-cyclical and reduce output volatility. In the case
of high-risk countries, investors fear big losses due to government defaults,
exchange rate collapses or panic selling by other investors. Therefore, in-
vestors carefully observe changes in growth expectations and the action of
other investors. If there are signs of a recession, they withdraw their money
as soon as possible. In that case, international capital inﬂows are pro-cyclical
and ﬁnancial openness increases output volatility.
The hypothesis is tested using a sample of 62 countries in the period 1980-
2007. Evidence is found that ﬁnancial openness increases output volatility in
risky countries and decreases output volatility in low-risk countries. Financial
openness is thus an important determinant of output volatility if due account
is taken of ﬁnancial risk. In addition to its academic contribution, the paper
has policy implications. It oﬀers clear criteria that a country needs to fulﬁll
in order to gain from ﬁnancial openness in terms of reduced output volatility.
The result is robust to changes in the operating deﬁnition of the variables,
the sample size and the functional form of the model.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Politiker müssen über den Integrationsgrad ihrer Finanzmärkte entscheiden,
ohne die daraus resultierenden Konsequenzen für die Wachstumsvolatilität
ihres Landes abschätzen zu können. Denn hinsichtlich einer Antwort auf
die Frage, ob der Oﬀenheitsgrad der Finanzmärkte den Konjunkturzyklus
verstärkt oder dämpft, gibt es bisher weder auf theoretischer noch empirischer
Ebene Konsenz.
In diesem Papier wird die Hypothese aufgestellt, dass das “Finanzrisiko” die
Beziehung von Wachstumsvolatilität und Finanzmarktoﬀenheit beeinﬂusst.
Mit Finanzrisiko ist die Fähigkeit (bzw. Bereitschaft) eines Landes gemeint,
Schulden zu begleichen und seinen Wechselkurs stabil zu halten. Die Hy-
pothese fußt auf der Annahme, dass diese Art des Risikos die Entschei-
dung von ausländischen Investoren hinsichtlich Art und Dauer ihres Engage-
ments beeinﬂusst: In Ländern mit niedrigem Finanzrisiko kaufen Investoren
während einer Rezession verstärkt Aktien, um die selbst für aussichtsreiche
Firmen relativ niedrigen Preise auszunutzen. Des Weiteren ﬁnanzieren aus-
ländische Investoren proﬁtversprechende Projekte, die andernfalls aufgrund
von geringem inländischem Kreditangebot nicht ﬁnanziert würden. Demzu-
folge sind internationale Kapitalströme in diesen Ländern antizyklisch and
dämpfen Wachstumsschwankungen. In Ländern mit hohem Finanzrisiko
hingegen befürchten Investoren, ihr Geld aufgrund eines Wechselkursein-
bruchs oder der Zahlungsunfähigkeit eines Landes zu verlieren. Geringe
Anzeichen einer Rezession genügen, um Kapital in großen Mengen aus dem
Land ﬂießen zu lassen. In diesen Ländern sind internationale Kapitalﬂüsse
prozyklisch und verstärken Wachstumsschwankungen.
Die Hypothese wird mit Daten für 62 Länder in der Zeit von 1980 bis 2007
getestet. Das Ergebnis der Analyse zeigt, dass Finanzmarktoﬀenheit Wachs-
tumsschwankungen für risikoreiche Länder erhöht und sie in risikoarmen Län-
dern abschwächt. Des Weiteren können politische Entscheidungsträger aus
der Studie klare Kriterien ableiten, die erfüllt sein müssen, damit eine hohe
Finanzmarktintegration ihnen hilft, Wachstumsschwankungen zu dämpfen.Contents
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1 Introduction
Output volatility brings about economic and social problems which coun-
tries seek to avoid. For example, high output volatility is, by deﬁnition,
accompanied by deep recessions. The resulting high unemployment has a
disproportionate impact on the poorest; see Stiglitz (2000). This might in-
crease social inequality and even foster political unrest. Moreover, economic
growth is negatively aﬀected by output volatility, as was demonstrated by
Ramey and Ramey (1995) and others.
With output volatility in mind, countries have to decide on the extent of their
ﬁnancial integration. Experience from the past 25 years has led to uncertainty
regarding the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on output volatility. On the one
hand, the ﬁnancially deeply integrated United States had, until recently,
been experiencing declining output volatility since the 1980s. This period is
called the Great Moderation. On the other hand, some developing countries
that had opened up their ﬁnancial markets, i.e. Argentina, experienced deep
economic crises in the 1980s or 1990s. Does ﬁnancial openness lead to a
1Barbara Meller, Deutsche Bundesbank, Department of Financial Stability,
Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14, 60431 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Email: bar-
bara.meller@bundesbank.de. I wish to thank Dieter Nautz, Uwe Hassler, Marcel
Fratzscher, Jaap Bos and Thorben Krieger for their helpful comments. I am especially
grateful to Nicola Spatafora for sharing his data with me. Financial support by the Frank-
furt Graduate Program in Monetary Economics and Finance and the DFG is gratefully
acknowledged. Most research was done while the author was a PhD student at Goethe
University of Frankfurt and a postdoctoral fellow at Carlos III University of Madrid.
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Globalization on Output Volatilitydecline in output volatility or to economic crises? Countries are left without
generally accepted criteria in their decision on the regulation of their ﬁnancial
markets.
Much research has been conducted on the question of whether ﬁnancial open-
ness reduces or increases output volatility, but no consensus has been reached
yet. On the one hand, researchers expect ﬁnancial openness to stabilize the
economy. This is because ﬁnancial openness allows investments and sav-
ings to be eﬃciently allocated across geographic areas; see Fischer (1998).
Especially in recessions, greater access to (international) capital, and thus
borrowing, decreases economic volatility by reducing the sensitivity of con-
sumption and investments to negative income shocks. Since domestic output,
in turn, depends on consumption and investment, there are fewer second-
round eﬀects on output. In other words, the “traditional multiplier” response
is decreased; see Dynan et al. (2006). On the other hand, ﬁnancial open-
ness might increase output volatility due to movements of “hot money”. Kim
and Singal (2000) argue that international money is withdrawn if there is a
deterioration in expectations about interest rates or economic growth. The
real economy is not suﬃciently supplied with credits and is hit harder by an
economic downturn. Easterly et al. (2000) and Stiglitz (2000) therefore char-
acterize international capital ﬂows as potentially pro-cyclical and as inducing
or amplifying output ﬂuctuations.
As theory is inconclusive, empirical research should shed light on the rela-
tion between ﬁnancial openness and output volatility. However, empirical
evidence is rather mixed and does not resolve the issue. Some studies ﬁnd
that output volatility is decreased by ﬁnancial openness, e.g. Bekaert et al.
(2006). Other studies ﬁnd that the economy is destabilized as a consequence
of ﬁnancial openness, e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). Most
studies ﬁnd no signiﬁcant or stable relationship at all, e.g. Buch et al. (2005)
or Easterly et al. (2000). Owing to the inconclusiveness of past research,
Rogoﬀ et al. (2006) hypothesize, without testing, that this relation might
depend on a threshold level of one or several variable(s).
2This paper develops the idea of a threshold eﬀect and hypothesizes that the
eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on output volatility can be positive or negative
depending on ﬁnancial risk. Financial risk is measured by an index which
combines the information of ﬁve ﬁnancial risk measures: Foreign debt as a
percentage of GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of exports, current
account as a percentage of exports, net international liquidity as months of
import cover and exchange rate stability. The indicator therefore assesses the
ability of a country to pay its oﬃcial, commercial and trade debts, which is
the risk that an investor considers when investing in a country. If a country
bears more ﬁnancial risk than a certain threshold level, ﬁnancial openness
increases output volatility. In those countries, investors withdraw their cap-
ital in times of recessions and thereby deepen the recession. By contrast,
countries which bear less ﬁnancial risk than this threshold level attract new
capital in times of recessions due to better proﬁt prospects and as a result of
the eﬃcient allocation of capital.
This paper ﬁnds empirically these two opposing and signiﬁcant eﬀects of ﬁ-
nancial openness on output volatility by using Hansen’s (1999) panel thresh-
old model. The model determines data-driven thresholds and classiﬁes coun-
tries as bearing diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial risk. In line with the hypothesis,
ﬁnancial openness increases output volatility in the high-risk classes, while
it decreases output volatility in the low-risk class. This relation between
ﬁnancial openness, ﬁnancial risk and output volatility is very robust as it
is invulnerable to modiﬁcations to the operating deﬁnition of the variables,
the sample size and the functional form of the model. The results of this
paper can serve as a guideline to countries that (re)consider their ﬁnancial
integration.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section motivates and describes
the threshold model. Section three describes the choice of variables and
the data. Section four reports the estimation results of the panel threshold
model. Section ﬁve demonstrates the robustness of the results. Section six
illustrates the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on Argentina and brieﬂy discusses
the policy implication of this paper. Finally, section seven concludes.
32 Threshold Model
Motivation
The literature is inconclusive on whether ﬁnancial openness reduces or in-
creases output volatility. In particular, the opposing views have the following
implications. Either foreign capital ﬂows are counter-cyclical, in line with the
argument of the eﬃcient allocation of capital, and reduce output volatility.
Or, foreign capital ﬂows are pro-cyclical, in line with the argument of hot
money, and increase output volatility. If one assumes that foreign capital
ﬂows may be of both types, the most important question is: For which cri-
terion are foreign capital ﬂows pro-cyclical and for which counter-cyclical.
The type of ﬂow then determines whether ﬁnancial openness increases or
decreases output volatility.
This paper takes the perspective of an investor in order to conjecture on a
criterion that determines whether foreign capital ﬂows are pro- or counter-
cyclical. If an investor is almost sure that her investment is refunded irre-
spectively of the action of other investors, then there is no reason to withdraw
her investment in downturns. On the contrary, the investor will even invest
in such a recessive country as she expects high proﬁts. She may buy stocks of
relatively cheap ﬁrms with good future prospects. Or she may lend money to
prospering projects which domestic banks might not be willing to ﬁnance in
a recession.2 Under this scenario, foreign capital inﬂows are counter-cyclical.
By contrast, if an investor fears that her investment might be lost (owing,
for example, to government default or exchange rate collapse), she will ob-
serve not only changes in the country’s economy but also the action of other
investors very carefully. If there is a sign of a recession, the investor with-
draws her money as soon as possible. In that case, foreign capital inﬂows are
pro-cyclical.
2Easterly et al. (2000) argue that during recessions, the default rate of credits is higher
for domestic ﬁnancial institutions. Therefore, they are less willing or able to bear risk and
they provide fewer credits even to good projects.
4Figure 2.1: Exemplary Eﬀect of Financial Openness on Output Volatility
The criterion whether foreign capital ﬂows are pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical
is therefore a certain threshold level of risk to which an investment is exposed.
This risk is captured by the ﬁnancial risk rating of the International Country
Risk Guide. The rating measures a country’s exchange rate stability and
its dependence on foreign money. Figure 2.1 illustrates the hypothesized
dependence of output volatility and ﬁnancial openness on ﬁnancial risk.
The underlying assumption of the paper’s hypothesis is that the cyclicality of
capital ﬂows depends on ﬁnancial risk. In order to lend some support to this
assumption, the correlation between the business cycle component of out-
put (band-pass ﬁltered real per capita GDP) and capital inﬂows (percentage
change in a country’s foreign liabilities) is computed for diﬀerent values of
the ﬁnancial risk rating. The risk rating runs from 0, very high risk, to 50,
very low risk. For the computation, the sample described in the next section
is used: 62 countries in the period 1980-2007. Figure 2.2 plots the correlation
between business cycle and capital inﬂow against a 20-point rolling window
of ﬁnancial risk. For example, at point zero of the x-axis, the correlation is
computed for countries which have a ﬁnancial risk between 0 and 20. From
the ﬁgure, one can indeed deduce that the correlation is positive (i.e. capital
inﬂow is pro-cyclical) for ﬁnancially risky countries and negative (i.e. capital
inﬂow is counter-cyclical) for ﬁnancially non-risky countries.
5Figure 2.2: Correlation Between Business Cycle and Capital Inﬂow Plotted
against a Rolling-Window of Financial Risk
Estimation Method
The panel threshold model developed by Hansen (1999) is used to test the
paper’s hypothesis. This model divides observations of the variable of interest
into classes depending on the value of a certain threshold variable. The
coeﬃcient of the variable of interest is therefore a step function depending
on the threshold variable. The model is particularly suitable if one expects
that the coeﬃcient of the variable of interest changes more or less abruptly
at a certain threshold. This is the case in the paper’s hypothesis. If output
volatility is regressed on ﬁnancial openness, then the coeﬃcient of ﬁnancial
openness is expected to change its sign once a certain level of ﬁnancial risk is
exceeded. Using this model, data-driven thresholds can be found and their
signiﬁcance can be tested.
The model relies on some assumptions that have to be fulﬁlled. Firstly,
the sample has to being balanced. Secondly, the error terms should be ho-
moscedastic and serially uncorrelated. According to Hansen (1999), how-
ever, a violation of this assumption is not a severe problem. In the presence
of heteroscedasticity or serial correlation, the threshold estimates are still
consistent but the bootstrapped p-values are not reliable. To correct for a
potential bias in the slope coeﬃcients of threshold regression (2.1) below,
6White-Huber standard errors can be used. Thirdly, the explanatory vari-
ables have to be exogenous. However, a modiﬁcation to this model which is
proposed by Kremer et al. (2008) may also handle endogenous variables.
The general threshold model regression with K thresholds is deﬁned as fol-
lows:
yit = Qit +
K 1 X
k=0
k+1xitI(k < qit  k+1) + K+1xitI(K < qit) + "it; (2.1)
where I() is the indicator function and k is the kth threshold and 0=0.
Furthermore, yit is the dependent variable, Qit is the vector of control vari-
ables including country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, and xit is the variable of interest
which coeﬃcient is suspected to depend on qit, the threshold variable.
The threshold estimation is conducted in two steps as proposed by Hansen
(1999). First, the ‘best’ threshold from a set of equally spaced values of
the threshold variable is chosen. To that end, the sum of squared errors for
all threshold models using each potential threshold is calculated. The ‘best’
threshold is then the one that corresponds to the threshold model with the
smallest sum of squared errors. In a second step, it is veriﬁed whether the
threshold eﬀect is signiﬁcant. Under the null hypothesis of no threshold, the
threshold is not identiﬁed and the test does not have a known distribution.
Therefore, bootstrapping is used in order to simulate a distribution that
makes inference on the signiﬁcance of the threshold possible. If the threshold
is signiﬁcant, it is tested whether there is another threshold. Signiﬁcance is
established at the 10% signiﬁcance level here. Given the ﬁrst threshold, the
same procedure as before is used in order to ﬁnd a second threshold. Three
or more thresholds can be found analogously.
73 Variable Selection and Data Description
In this section, I elaborate on the measurement of ﬁnancial openness and
ﬁnancial risk. Furthermore, output volatility and the control variables are
introduced. Lastly, the source and coverage of the data are described.
Financial openness variables are either de facto or de jure measures. Most
prominently used de jure measures are indicator variables for equity market
liberalization used, for example, by Bekaert et al. (2006) and Jayasuriya
(2005) or the number of restrictions on the capital account used, for example,
by Buch et al. (2005), Chinn and Ito (2006). Rogoﬀ et al. (2006) describe
those measures in detail and emphasize that de jure measures cannot capture
the actual eﬀect of capital controls or liberalization. They argue that a
country which has very liberal capital account laws does not necessarily have
to be heavily involved in international ﬁnancial investments. Furthermore,
liberalizations do not necessarily happen at one point in time but materialize
gradually. By contrast, de facto variables are continuous variables and do
not suﬀer from these drawbacks.
A commonly used de facto measure of ﬁnancial openness is gross capital
ﬂows divided by GDP used, for example, by Buch et al. (2005), Kose et al.
(2003) and Kose et al. (2005). Another measure of ﬁnancial openness is
banks’ foreign assets in percent of banks’ total assets used by Buch et al.
(2005). Furthermore, Beck et al. (1999) construct two measures of foreign
bank penetration: ﬁrstly, the ratio of the number of foreign banks to the
number of domestic banks and secondly, the ratio of the assets of foreign
bank to the assets of domestic banks. While the last two measures have a
good cross-country coverage, they are available only since 1990.
Following Rogoﬀ et al. (2006), the sum of gross stocks of foreign assets and
liabilities as ratio to GDP is used in this analysis.3 Rogoﬀ et al. (2006) argue
3Foreign liabilities= Portfolio equity liabilities + FDI liabilities +debt liabilities +
ﬁnancial derivatives (liabilities). Foreign assets= portfolio equity assets + FDI assets +
debt assets + ﬁnancial derivatives (assets) + total reserves minus gold.
8that this variable is less volatile and less prone to measurement errors than
ﬂow variables. Furthermore, this de facto measure has a broad coverage.
Financial risk is measured by the ﬁnancial risk rating, which is an element of
the International Country Risk Guide published by the Political Risk Services
group.4 The ﬁnancial risk rating measures a country’s capacity to pay for its
oﬃcial, commercial, and trade debt obligations. A higher risk rating indicates
low ﬁnancial risk. The rating consists of 0 to 50 risk points aggregated over
ﬁve ﬁnancial risk components: Foreign debt as a percentage of GDP (0-10
risk points), foreign debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and
services (0-10 risk points), current account as a percentage of exports of
goods and services (0-15 risk points), net international liquidity as months of
import cover (0-5 risk points) and exchange rate stability (0-10 risk points).
This weighting is the one published by the PRS group and, therefore, the
one investors are most likely to work with. For that reason, this weighting is
also employed in this paper.
The ﬁnancial risk rating is used by academics and investors alike. According
to Hoti and McAleer (2004), the interest in ﬁnancial risk ratings is due to
the increased international debt of developing countries since the 1970s and
the incidences of debt rescheduling in the early 1980s. The rating inﬂuences
investment decisions because they aﬀect investors’ expectations of the risk-
return features of their investments (Hoti and McAleer 2004). Examples of
academic studies employing the ﬁnancial risk rating are Hoti and McAleer
(2004), Hassan et al. (2003), IMF (2008), Girard and Omran (2007), Bekaert
et al. (2006) and Jayasuriya (2005).
Next, the measures of output volatility and of the control variables are pre-
sented. Output volatility is commonly measured as the standard deviation
of GDP growth over a ﬁve-year window. In order to enhance the presenta-
tion of the estimation results, this deﬁnition of output volatility is multiplied
by a factor of 100. Variables which are most commonly used to explain out-
4According to Hoti and McAleer (2004), the International Country Risk Guide is the
only risk rating agency to provide detailed and consistent monthly data over an extended
period for a large number of countries.
9put volatility are monetary policy quality, ﬁscal policy quality, supply shocks
and trade openness, e.g. Karras and Song (1996) and Buch et al. (2005).
In this analysis, inﬂation, government expenditure growth, standard devia-
tion of terms of trade growth and the sum of exports and imports divided by
GDP are used to capture those concepts. In addition, ﬁnancial risk is used
as control variable. This assures that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness in dif-
ferent risk classes is not driven by ﬁnancial risk solely but also by ﬁnancial
openness as a function of ﬁnancial risk.
In the empirical analysis, annual data for 26 developed countries and 36 de-
veloping countries are used. Countries are chosen on the grounds of data
availability and are listed in Table 7.1 in the Appendix. The sample period
1980-2007 is chosen, ﬁrstly, because ﬁnancial globalization arguably gained
pace from 1980 onwards and, secondly, because observations in the balanced
panel are maximized for this sample period. Output volatility and control
variables are available for the time period 1980-2007.5 The ﬁnancial risk rat-
ing covers the period 1984-2006. Financial openness is available for the period
1980-2004.6 The variables are calculated over a ﬁve-year period (seven years
for the last time period) using either averages or standard deviations accord-
ing to their deﬁnition. The ﬁve-year window is typically chosen because a
full business cycle lasts about this long. For the analysis, non-overlapping
windows instead of rolling windows are used in order to avoid problems stem-
ming from serial correlation. The periods run from 1980-1984, 1985-1989, ...,
2000-2007, if data availability permits. Consequently, the time series dimen-
sion contains ﬁve observations. In the Appendix, deﬁnitions of the variables
as well as the sources of the data are provided in Table 7.3. Moreover, de-
scriptive statistics are presented in Table 7.2 and country-averages of output
volatility, ﬁnancial openness and ﬁnancial risk are plotted over time in Figure
7.1 in the Appendix.
5Data for 2007 are based on projections from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook
database. Fiscal policy quality covers only the period 1981-2007 for the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, New Zealand, South Africa, Bolivia, Brazil, the Dominican Republic,
Israel, Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Tanzania and Togo.
6Except for Malawi and Haiti, where ﬁnancial openness covers 1980-2003.
104 Empirical Analysis
In this section, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on output volatility is esti-
mated. First, a linear regression is estimated revealing that there is no linear
relation between ﬁnancial openness and output volatility. Then, the thresh-
old model is estimated to verify the working hypothesis of a two-sided eﬀect
of ﬁnancial openness on output volatility.
As a benchmark for the threshold estimation, a linear regression is estimated:
Y it = Qit + FinOpenit + "it (4.1)
The dependent variable is output volatility. Q is the vector of control vari-
ables including time and country ﬁxed eﬀects and FinOpen is ﬁnancial open-
ness. The statistics of this regression can be found in Table 4.1. The usual
OLS standard errors are not systematically diﬀerent from the White-Huber
standard errors. Nevertheless, the analysis of the coeﬃcients in this and the
following regressions relies on White-Huber standard errors which render the
p-values robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at no cost.7
The regression indicates that there is no signiﬁcant linear relation between ﬁ-
nancial openness and output volatility. Turning to the control variables, more
terms of trade volatility and higher inﬂation lead to more output volatility
but not signiﬁcantly. High government expenditure signiﬁcantly increases
output volatility. This indicates that large government spending might be a
sign of macroeconomic imbalances or proﬂigacy and thereby destabilize the
economy. More trade openness leads to more output volatility. This con-
ﬁrms the argument of Giovanni and Levchenko (2006) stating that ﬁrstly,
traded sectors are more volatile than other sectors and that secondly, trade
leads to specialization. Giovanni and Levchenko (2006) acknowledge that
traded sectors have a smaller correlation with the domestic economy but this
implicit negative relation with output volatility is oﬀset by the former pos-
7In contrast to time-series regressions, the White-Huber standard errors are robust
to serial correlation in panel regressions of the form “small T, large N”, see Wooldridge
(2002).
11Table 4.1: Benchmark: The Linear Model
Y it = Qit + FinOpenit + "it
regressor coeﬃcient White std.err. OLS std.err.
 0.387 0.249 (0.121) 0.208 (0.064)
Gov 0.311  0.144 (0.032) 0.100 (0.002)
ToT 0.037 0.043 (0.386) 0.018 (0.042)
TraOpen 3.789  1.815 (0.038) 1.234 (0.002)
FinRisk -0.125 0.031 (0.000) 0.035 (0.000)
FinOpen 0.064 0.125 (0.609) 0.150 (0.669)
R2[  R2] 0.25 [0.22]
Notes: The dependent variable is output volatility. Q =control variables as well
as time and country ﬁxed eﬀects.  = monetary policy. Gov = ﬁscal policy.
ToT = supply shock volatility. TraOpen = trade openness. FinRisk =
ﬁnancial risk. FinOpen = ﬁnancial openness. Deﬁnitions of the variables can
be found in Table 7.3. 62 countries and ﬁve time periods are used (i.e. 310
observations). 5-year non-overlapping windows are used. *** (**, *) denote
signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level using White-Huber standard errors,
p-values relying on normal approximation are given in parenthesis.
itive eﬀects. Lastly, a high ﬁnancial risk rating implying low ﬁnancial risk,
decreases output volatility.
A general problem in the discussion on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness (or
policy quality) on output volatility is the question of reversed causality and
endogeneity. Economically, both problems are hard to argue against. This
paper only tackles the question of whether the empirical results are biased
due to statistical endogeneity. In order to test whether any regressor is en-
dogenous, the regression-based Hausman test is applied to regression (4.1).
Each variable is tested for exogeneity separately. Instrumental variables are
particularly diﬃcult to ﬁnd for this large sample due to data availability.
Not only must the instruments be correlated to the potentially endogenous
variable, they must also provide more information on the potentially en-
12dogenous variable than all other exogenous variables in the regression. This
“rank condition” is fulﬁlled if the instrument is signiﬁcant in a reduced form
regression.8 The second condition that needs to be fulﬁlled is that of the
instruments’ exogeneity.
Two approaches are implemented to test endogeneity. Firstly, ﬁrst diﬀer-
encing instead of within transformation is used in order to eliminate ﬁxed
eﬀects. In that way, the second lag of the variable can be used as an instru-
ment. The rank condition is fulﬁlled for inﬂation, government expenditure
growth, ﬁnancial risk and ﬁnancial openness. As can be deduced from the
p-values in the ﬁrst panel of Table 4.2, the regression-based Hausman test
indicates that the variables are exogenous, applying a 10% signiﬁcance level.
Secondly, trade openness and terms of trade variation are instrumented by
variables not used in the original regression: constraints on the executive and
current account balance divided by GDP, respectively.9 Using those instru-
ments, the rank condition and the Hausman test indicate that trade openness
and terms of trade variation are exogenous as well; see second panel of Table
4.2. Therefore, all variables used in this analysis are statistically exogenous.
In the next step, Hansen’s threshold model is applied. It will be determined
whether the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on output volatility depends on the
ﬁnancial risk that a country bears. The statistics of the ﬁrst panel in Ta-
8In the reduced form regression, the instrument as well as all exogenous variables are
regressed on the potentially endogenous variable. If the instrument is signiﬁcant, then it
can be used in the endogeneity test.
9Instruments are chosen on the grounds of passing the rank condition. “Constraints
on the executive” is an index running from 1 to 7 measuring the extent of institutional-
ized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, such as the legislatures.
The variable was initially compiled and described by Gurr et al. (1989). Current account
balance divided by GDP is retrieved from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database.
Exogeneity of the instruments is tested in the following way. The variable to be instru-
mented is substituted by its instrument in regression (4.1). Using ﬁrst diﬀerencing instead
of the within transformation and the variables second lag as an instrument, as before,
yields the test regression. From the statistics in the third panel of Table 4.2, it can be de-
duced that both variables, constraints on the executive and current account balance, pass
the rank condition and the Hausman test.
13Table 4.2: Endogeneity Tests
Variable Instruments rank condition Hausman
 2. lag 0.000 0.395
Gov 2. lag 0.032 0.801
TraOpen 2. lag 0.203 0.238
ToT 2. lag 0.788 0.489
FinRisk 2. lag 0.000 0.727
FinOpen 2. lag 0.011 0.185
TraOpen xconst 0.001 0.847
ToT CA 0.003 0.315
xconst 2. lag 0.000 0.218
CA 2. lag 0.012 0.902
Notes: In the ﬁrst and third panel, ﬁrst diﬀerencing is used to eliminate ﬁxed
eﬀects while in the second panel, the within transformation is used.  = mon-
etary policy. Gov = ﬁscal policy. ToT = supply shocks. TraOpen = trade
openness. FinRisk = ﬁnancial risk. FinOpen = ﬁnancial openness. xconst =
constraints put on the executive. CA = current account balance / GDP. In the
last two columns, robust p-values are presented. A valid instrument must fulﬁll
the rank condition, i.e. the p-value of the rank condition must be smaller than
0.10. A variable is exogenous if the p-value of the (regression-based) Hausman
test is greater than 0.10.
14ble 4.3 indicate that the signiﬁcance of a double threshold is not rejected if
the alternative is a triple threshold. Furthermore, the p-values of 0.058 in
the second panel and of 0.065 in the third panel of Table 4.3 imply that the
hypotheses of a single and no threshold are rejected at the 10% level, respec-
tively. Therefore, the double threshold model is the appropriate model to
work with.10 As the upper part of Table 4.4 indicates, the two thresholds
are estimated to be at a ﬁnancial risk rating of 23 and 29. Therefore, coun-
tries are divided into three classes according to their level of ﬁnancial risk.
Countries with a level of ﬁnancial risk of 23 or below are classiﬁed as having
‘high-risk’ and are in class one. Countries with a level of ﬁnancial risk above
23 and less than or equal to 29 have ‘high-intermediate risk’ and are in class
two. Countries with a level of ﬁnancial risk above 29 are classiﬁed as having
‘low-risk’ and are in class three.
Having determined the number of thresholds as well as their point estimates,
the appropriate threshold regression (4.2) is estimated:
Y it = Qit + 1FinOpenitI(FinRiskit  23) + 2FinOpenit (4.2)
I(23 < FinRiskit  29) + 3FinOpenitI(FinRiskit > 29) + "it
As shown in the lower panel of Table 4.4, ﬁnancial openness is signiﬁcant in all
three ﬁnancial risk classes and has the expected signs. In countries with very
high ﬁnancial risk, ﬁnancial openness increases output volatility. In high-
intermediate risk countries, ﬁnancial openness also increases output volatility
but by less than in risky countries. By contrast, more ﬁnancial openness
decreases output volatility in a low-risk country. Section six will illustrate the
magnitude of the estimated eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on output volatility
in each risk class using the example of Argentina. Before that, the robustness
of the estimation result is tested in the next section.
10It might be argued that a 10% signiﬁcance level is not suﬃcient to establish the
signiﬁcance of the double threshold. In view of the signiﬁcance of ﬁnancial openness in
the second step, displayed in Table 4.4, the choice of the double threshold model seems,
however, appropriate.
15Table 4.3: Test Statistics Determining the Number of Thresholds
Y it = Qit +
PK 1
k=0 k+1FOitI(k < FRit  k+1) + K+1FOitI(K < FRit) + "it
Test against triple threshold: (H0: K=2, H1: K=3)
F3 6.17
p-value 0.259
critical values (10%, 5%, 1%): (9.23, 11.42, 17.44)
Test against double threshold: (H0: K=1, H1: K=2)
F2 17.77
p-value 0.058
critical values (10%, 5%, 1%): (12.24, 19.01, 33.74)
Test against single threshold: (H0: K=0, H1: K=1)
F1 25.48
p-value 0.065
critical values (10%, 5%, 1%): (17.52, 29.77, 55.15)
Notes: The dependent variable is output volatility. Q =control variables as
well as time and country ﬁxed eﬀects. FO = ﬁnancial openness. FR = the
threshold variable ﬁnancial risk rating. The deﬁnition of all variables can be
found in Table 7.3. k = kth threshold level (where 0 = 0) and K = number
of thresholds. The test statistic of a likelihood ratio, testing whether there are
k   1 versus k threshold(s), is denoted by Fk and indicates that the number
of thresholds is 2. 1000 bootstrap replications were used to obtain the critical
values and p-values. Each risk class is required to contain at least 10% of all
observations.
16Table 4.4: Estimation Results of Double Threshold Regression
Y it = Qit + 1FOitI(FR  ^ 1) + 2FOitI(^ 1 < FRit  ^ 2) + 3FOitI(FR > ^ 2) + "it
Threshold estimates
^ 1 23 [20, 24]







FinOpen I(FinRisk  23) 1.826 (0.001)
FinOpen I(23 < FinRisk  29) 0.513 (0.003)
FinOpen I(29 < FinRisk) -0.248 (0.086)
R2[  R2]: 0.34 [0.32]
Notes: The dependent variable is output volatility. Q =control variables as well as time and
country ﬁxed eﬀects.  = monetary policy. Gov = ﬁscal policy. ToT = supply shocks.
TraOpen = trade openness. FinRisk = ﬁnancial risk. FinOpen = ﬁnancial openness.
Deﬁnitions of the variables can be found in Table 7.3. 62 countries and ﬁve 5-year non-
overlapping time periods are used (i.e. 310 observations). *** (**, *) denote signiﬁcance
at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. Robust p-values are given in parenthesis and bootstrapped
conﬁdence intervals are given in brackets.
175 Assessing the Robustness of the Results
In order to check the robustness of the estimation results, three variations are
analyzed. Firstly, the robustness of the results with respect to the variables’
operational deﬁnitions is tested. Secondly, alternative model speciﬁcations
are implemented. And thirdly, the sample is extended and shortened. The
robustness checks conﬁrm that countries with low ﬁnancial risk proﬁt from
ﬁnancial globalization in terms of reduced output volatility while ﬁnancially
risky countries are negatively aﬀected by ﬁnancial openness.
Variation to the Deﬁnitions of the Variables
In this subsection, I use alternative deﬁnitions of ﬁnancial openness, output
volatility and the control variables in order to assess the robustness of the
paper’s result.
It might be argued that foreign companies’ location decision concerning for-
eign direct investments (FDI), which are included in the measure of ﬁnancial
openness, is aﬀected by countries’ output volatility. Since it was demon-
strated that ﬁnancial openness is exogenous, this issue does not seem to
aﬀect the estimation results. And indeed, the exclusion of FDI has virtually
no eﬀect on the number and level of thresholds or the signiﬁcance and sign
of ﬁnancial openness. A table with the estimation results is available upon
request.
Next, the standard deviation of the cyclical component of GDP is used as
an alternative measure of output volatility. In order to retrieve the cyclical
component, GDP is ﬁltered using the band-pass ﬁlter advocated by Baxter
and King (1999).11 When repeating the analysis of Section 4 using the cycli-
11I follow Baxter and King (1999) who propose using those ﬂuctuations that last at least
two years and at most eight years to capture the business cycle. In order to enhance the
presentation of the estimations, output volatility is deﬁned here as the standard deviation
of the cyclical component of per capita GDP multiplied by 100.
18cal component of GDP, the main results do not change. Selected statistics
of this regression can be found in Table 7.4 in the Appendix.
Lastly, the robustness of the results with respect to the choice of control
variables is established. To that end, alternative measures of the control
variables are used to estimate threshold model (4.2). This robustness check
is a variant of Leamer’s (1983) and Levine and Renelt’s (1992) extreme
bounds analysis. The extreme bounds analysis yields upper and lower bounds
for the three coeﬃcients of ﬁnancial openness from all possible combinations
of control variables. As alternative measures of policy quality the variance of
inﬂation and government expenditure growth are used. Furthermore, terms
of trade growth was used instead of its standard deviation. As an alternative
to the ﬁnancial risk rating, short-term interest rates were used. Threshold
regression (4.2) is then run sixteen times. Each regression includes all ﬁve
control variables, but a diﬀerent combination of their measures. Out of these
regressions, Table 5.1 lists the highest and lowest coeﬃcients together with
the p-value of ﬁnancial openness in each of the three risk classes. The sign
of the coeﬃcients of ﬁnancial openness has changed in none of the sixteen
regressions, and the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant in all regressions. Therefore,
the results of this paper are robust to alternative measurements of the control
variables.
Variation to the Model Speciﬁcation
In this subsection, the threshold model speciﬁcations are modiﬁed in various
ways to determine the model which best ﬁts the data. A ﬁrst modiﬁcation
concerns the functional form. Output volatility cannot be negative and,
therefore, it might enhance the ﬁt of the model to take the logarithm of
output volatility. Estimation results of the thus modiﬁed version of regression
(4.2) reveal that all three risk classes remain signiﬁcant and keep their signs.
Since the adjusted R-squared is smaller than for the original regression and
for the sake of comparison with previous research, output volatility and not
19Table 5.1: Robustness to Measurement of Control Variables
coeﬃcient p-value












Notes: Regression(4.2) is run sixteen times. In each regression, diﬀerent mea-
sures of the control variables and their permutations are used. The estimated
coeﬃcient and p-value for “base” refer to the threshold model of section 4. The
rows labeled “high” and “low” give the highest and lowest estimate of the sixteen
regressions.
20its logarithm is used in this paper. A table with the estimation results is
available upon request.
The last model modiﬁcation changes the interaction between ﬁnancial open-
ness and ﬁnancial risk. First, I allow for the third, insigniﬁcant threshold at
FinRisk = 40 and estimate the triple threshold model:
Y it=Qit+1FinOpenitI(FinRiskit23)+2FinOpenitI(23<FinRiskit29) (5.1)
+3FinOpenitI(29<FinRiskit40)+4FinOpenitI(FinRiskit>40)+"it
The estimation results can be seen in Table 5.2. All four classes are signiﬁcant
and the signs are consistent with the results of the double threshold model.
The coeﬃcient of ﬁnancial openness is positive for the two more risky classes
and negative for the two less risky classes. The adjusted R-squared is higher
than in the double threshold model. Furthermore, Wald tests indicate that
the coeﬃcients of ﬁnancial openness in the diﬀerent classes are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from each other. The coeﬃcients decrease monotonously from more
risky to less risky classes. This leads to the notion that the relation between
ﬁnancial risk and the coeﬃcient of ﬁnancial openness might be a linear rather
than a step function.
Therefore, I include an interaction term of ﬁnancial openness and ﬁnancial
risk in the linear regression (4.1). The relevant estimation results can be
found in Table 7.5 in the Appendix. Financial openness and the interaction
term are highly signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of ﬁnancial openness is positive,
while the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is negative, conﬁrming that the
eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness decreases and turns negative when ﬁnancial risk
decreases (and the ﬁnancial risk rating increases). The eﬀect of ﬁnancial
openness on output volatility becomes negative when FinRisk = 36:5.
Compared to the double threshold model, the triple threshold model has a
higher adjusted R-squared, while the linear regression with the interaction
term has a lower adjusted R-squared. In terms of this model selection crite-
rion, the triple threshold model is the superior model. Therefore, estimation
results and tables of the triple threshold model are presented as a supplement
in what follows.
21Table 5.2: Estimation Results: Triple Threshold Regression
Y it = Qit + 1FOitI(FR  1) + ::: + 4FOitI(FR > 3) + "it
Threshold estimates
^ 1 23 [20, 24]
^ 2 29 [27, 39]







FinOpen I(FinRisk  ^ 1) 1.879 (0.000)
FinOpen I(^ 1 < FinRisk  ^ 2) 0.537 (0.002)
FinOpen I(^ 2 < FinRisk  ^ 3) -0.230 (0.075)
FinOpen I(^ 3 < FinRisk) -0.520 (0.010)
R2[  R2]: 0.36 [0.33]
Notes: The dependent variable is output volatility. Q =control variables as well
as time and country ﬁxed eﬀects.  = monetary policy. Gov = ﬁscal policy.
ToT = supply shocks. TraOpen = trade openness. FinRisk = ﬁnancial risk.
FinOpen = ﬁnancial openness. Deﬁnitions of the variables can be found in
Table 7.3. 62 countries and ﬁve 5-year non-overlapping time periods are used
(i.e. 310 observations). *** (**, *) denote signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%, 10%)
level. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses and conﬁdence intervals are
given in brackets.
22Variations to the Sample
As the last robustness check, the sample is varied. The use of Hansen’s panel
threshold model restricts the panel to be balanced. However, the panel has
to be balanced only in order to determine the number and the value of the
thresholds. By taking the thresholds of the balanced panel as given, one
may estimate the double threshold regression (4.2) and the triple threshold
regression (5.1) in order to obtain coeﬃcients of ﬁnancial openness in the
diﬀerent risk classes for an unbalanced panel. The extended panel consists
of 86 instead of 62 countries with four to ﬁve time observations, leading to a
total of 406 observations.12
Table 5.3 presents the estimation results of the double threshold regression
(4.2) and the triple threshold regression (5.1) when using the unbalanced
panel. The signs of ﬁnancial openness in all risk classes are unchanged. Fur-
ther, ﬁnancial openness is highly signiﬁcant for the two most risky classes.
However, ﬁnancial openness turns insigniﬁcant in the low-risk class of the
double threshold model and the low-intermediate risk class of the triple
threshold model. Remarkably, the very low-risk class of the triple thresh-
old model is signiﬁcantly negative, emphasizing that the relation between
ﬁnancial openness and output volatility is signiﬁcant for very low-risk coun-
tries in the extended panel, too. The main results obtained for the balanced
panel are therefore also applicable to this even greater sample.
Besides the extension of the sample, its reduction is considered as well. The
countries are divided into three income groups according to their World Bank
classiﬁcation: low income, middle income and high income. The double and
triple threshold regressions, (4.2) and (5.1), are then estimated leaving out
one of those groups at a time. Financial openness continues to have the same
signs in all three/four risk classes, except for the insigniﬁcant second risk
12The sample is extended with the following countries, covering the time period 1985-
2007: Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
Guinea, Hungary, Ivory Coast, Republic of Korea, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mozam-
bique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Poland, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zim-
babwe.
23Table 5.3: Estimation Results: The Unbalanced Panel
regressor double threshold triple threshold
FinOpen2.1/FinOpen3.1 1.531 (0.004) 1.590 (0.003)
FinOpen2.2/FinOpen3.2 0.451 (0.002) 0.475 (0.001)
FinOpen2.3/FinOpen3.3 -0.113 (0.332) -0.083 (0.474)
FinOpen3.4 -0.282 (0.087)
R2[  R2] 0.27 [0.24] 0.26 [0.24]
Notes: FinOpen k:l equals ﬁnancial openness if the observation is in risk class
l of a model with k thresholds, and equals zero otherwise. An observation
is e.g. in risk class 1 if FinRisk  ^ 1. 86 countries and four to ﬁve 5-year
non-overlapping time periods are used, leading to 406 observations. Time and
country ﬁxed eﬀects are included. *** (**, *) denote signiﬁcance at the 1%
(5%, 10%) level. Robust p-values are given in parenthesis. The thresholds of
regression (4.2) [and (5.1)] are used: 23, 29[, 40].
class if high income countries are excluded; see Table 7.6 in the Appendix.
However, the third risk class turns insigniﬁcant when leaving out low and
middle income countries. More importantly, the ﬁrst and the fourth risk
class in the triple threshold model are always signiﬁcant. Therefore, the
general result of this paper is conﬁrmed even under sample variations.
The robustness checks in this section demonstrated that the general result
of this paper is valid even under modiﬁcations to variables, model and sam-
ple: ﬁnancial openness signiﬁcantly decreases output volatility in high-risk
countries and signiﬁcantly reduces output volatility in low-risk countries.
6 Interpretation and Implication of the
Estimation Results
In this section, I would like to give a meaning to the coeﬃcients of ﬁnancial
openness and interpret the results of this paper in terms of policy implica-
tions.
24As can be seen in Table 4.4, an increase in ﬁnancial openness by one unit
(i.e. an increase of the sum of a country’s foreign assets and liabilities by
the amount of its GDP) leads to an increase in output volatility of 1.826
(0.513) units if a country has high (high-intermediate) ﬁnancial risk. Low-
risk countries experience a reduction in output volatility of 0.248 units under
the same scenario.
But how great is the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on output volatility in per-
centage terms in reality? By how much does ﬁnancial openness in an exem-
plary country change from one period to the next? In order to illustrate the
estimated eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness on output volatility, Argentina is de-
scribed, since it is a country with an eventful past which has been in all three
risk classes in the past 27 years. In Argentina, ﬁnancial openness increased
from 0.5 to 2.1 units between the early 1980s and the early 2000s.
In the 1980s, Argentina suﬀered from economic stagnation and hyperinﬂation
as a result of protectionist and populist economic policies (Hoti and McAleer
2004). In this period, output volatility was, on average, 5.6 and ﬁnancial risk
was high. Combining this information with the estimation results of the last
section, ﬁnancial openness was responsible for about 19% of output volatility
in the 1980s.13
In the 1990s, Argentina successfully developed its economy and brought back
conﬁdence in the domestic currency. Argentina got through the Mexican
and Asian ﬁnancial crisis relatively well, partly because the falling dollar in-
creased its competitiveness in European markets; see Krueger (2002). In
this period, output volatility was 4.9 on average and ﬁnancial risk was low.
13This is computed as follows: ﬁnancial openness in the period 1980-1984 was 0.451.
Multiplying ﬁnancial openness by the coeﬃcient of ﬁnancial openness in risk class 1, gives
0.824. The actual output volatility at that time was 4.603. If ﬁnancial openness had
been zero, output volatility should have been less, namely 4.603-0.824=3.780. Therefore,
if ﬁnancial openness had been zero, output volatility would have been 17.9% smaller.
Putting it diﬀerently, ﬁnancial openness was responsible for 17.9% of output volatility. In
the period 1985-1989, ﬁnancial openness was responsible for 20.9% of output volatility.
Hence, in the period 1980-1989, ﬁnancial openness was responsible for around 19% of
output volatility.
25Table 6.1: Percentage of Countries in Each Risk Class by Year
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
very high-risk 29% 29% 6% 2% 0%
high-intermediate risk 26% 31% 23% 8% 8%
low-risk 45% 40% 71% 90% 92%
low-intermediate
risk
18% 9% 31% 59% 73%
very low-risk 27% 31% 40% 31% 19%
Note: The table displays the percentage of countries in the sample which have
been in a certain risk class during a certain time period. The low-risk class
is split up into low-intermediate risk and very low-risk in accordance with the
third and fourth risk class of the triple threshold model. The table indicates a
shift towards less ﬁnancial risk.
Financial openness in combination with the low level of ﬁnancial risk re-
duced output volatility by 4% in comparison with a hypothetical situation
with closed ﬁnancial markets. In 1999-2002, Argentina experienced an eco-
nomic crisis: the currency peg had to be abandoned, bank deposits had to be
frozen to prevent further bank runs, and external debt payments had to be
suspended. During this period, output volatility was 7.3 and ﬁnancial risk
was high-intermediate. According to the estimation results, ﬁnancial open-
ness in combination with intermediate risk was responsible for 14% of output
volatility.
The case of Argentina illustrates how great the estimated eﬀect of ﬁnancial
openness on output volatility can be. The estimation results of the earlier
analysis attribute up to 21% of output volatility in Argentina to ﬁnancial
openness. This stresses that policy-makers should attempt to reduce ﬁnan-
cial risk in order to prevent high output volatility stemming from ﬁnancial
openness.
For that matter, policy-makers are given clear criteria on how to improve
their ﬁnancial risk. If a country’s ﬁnancial risk is below the threshold value
of 28, policy-makers should make an eﬀort to improve in terms of one or more
26components of the risk rating. For example, the ﬁnancial risk component
“foreign debt as a percentage of GDP” can be raised from an initial ﬁve risk
points to its maximum value of ten risk points if policy-makers are able to
reduce foreign debt from 50% to less than 5% of GDP. In the case of the
ﬁnancial risk component “exchange rate stability”, the currency of a country
having ﬁve risk points in this component has an annual depreciation with
respect to the US dollar of more than 50% or an appreciation between 30%
and 34.9%. In order to increase the risk rating to the maximum of 10 risk
points, the country must ensure that its exchange rate changes only within
the boundary of -5% to 10%. Accordingly, policymakers have clear criteria
on how to reap the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial openness for output volatility.
The risk class of all countries for each period can be found in Table 7.7 in
the Appendix. Table 6.1 summarizes the number of countries that belong to
either one of the three risk classes in a given year. In the 1980s, countries were
relatively evenly spread over the risk classes. However, a shift from higher
risk classes to lower risk classes over time becomes apparent. Therefore,
more and more countries may beneﬁt from ﬁnancial globalization in terms of
reduced output volatility.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper identiﬁes ﬁnancial risk as a variable that determines whether
ﬁnancial openness increases or decreases output volatility. I hypothesized
that ﬁnancial risk aﬀects an investor’s decision on whether to make pro- or
counter-cyclical investments. In the case of low-risk countries, investors in-
vest during recessions because ﬁrms with good future prospects are relatively
cheap. Furthermore, they lend money to prospering projects which domes-
tic banks might not be willing to ﬁnance as they are less able to bear risk
27in recessions.14 Therefore, international capital inﬂows are counter-cyclical
and reduce output volatility. In the case of high-risk countries, investors fear
big losses due to government default, exchange rate collapse or panic selling
by other investors. Investors carefully observe changes in growth expecta-
tions and the action of other investors. If there are signs of a recession, they
withdraw their money as soon as possible. In that case, international capital
inﬂows are pro-cyclical and ﬁnancial openness increases output volatility.
The results of an empirical analysis using a threshold model support this
hypothesis. They indeed indicate that ﬁnancial openness increases output
volatility if a country has high-risk (ﬁnancial risk rating of 28 or below)
and it decreases output volatility for low-risk countries (ﬁnancial risk rating
above 28). As the risk rating is based on objective criteria, countries have
clear guidance on what they need to improve in order to proﬁt from ﬁnancial
openness in terms of reduced output volatility. Therefore, the result of this
paper is important for policy decisions. Nevertheless, output volatility is not
the only issue policy-makers are concerned with when taking decisions on
ﬁnancial market regulations. It might be the case that growth opportunities
outweigh high output volatility, see Ranciere et al. (2006). In this case,
high-risk countries should not take the route of constraining capital markets
but of decreasing ﬁnancial risk. Most likely, such a strategy will not have
a negative eﬀect on growth, while signiﬁcantly reducing volatility. However,
a thorough analysis of the interacting eﬀects between ﬁnancial risk, output
volatility and growth is not pursued here but left for further research. In
general, the paper provides evidence that ﬁnancial openness becomes more
favorable in the context of output volatility as ﬁnancial risk decreases.
Properly implemented, ﬁnancial openness is an important determinant of
output volatility. Based on the ﬁnding of this paper, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial
openness on output volatility depends on the country’s ﬁnancial risk. There-
fore, ﬁnancial openness should be included as a function of ﬁnancial risk in
14Easterly et al. (2000) argue that during recessions, the default rate of credits is higher
for domestic ﬁnancial institutions. Therefore, banks are less willing or able to bear risk
and they provide fewer credits.
28macroeconomic models and regressions explaining output volatility. If ﬁnan-
cial risk is not used as a mediating variable, then the two opposing eﬀects
of ﬁnancial openness might cancel each other out, rendering ﬁnancial open-
ness insigniﬁcant. Financial risk is therefore likely to be what Buch et al.
(2005) call the “missing link” in determining the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness
on output volatility.
The result is robust. Several variables were included in the threshold regres-
sion to control for the quality of ﬁscal and monetary policy, for supply shocks,
for trade openness and for ﬁnancial risk. Furthermore, time and country spe-
ciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects were included. As a robustness check, the measures of the
variables were changed: FDIs were excluded from ﬁnancial openness, output
volatility was measured as the standard deviation of the business-cycle com-
ponent of GDP and diﬀerent measures for the control variables were used.
Further, the robustness to modiﬁcations of the threshold model speciﬁcations
was tested: using the logarithm of output volatility, using three thresholds
or an interaction term of ﬁnancial openness and ﬁnancial risk. It was argued
by means of an information criterion that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial risk on the
relation between ﬁnancial openness and output volatility is better captured
by a threshold model than an interaction term. Moreover, country groups
were included in and excluded from the sample. None of these modiﬁca-
tions changed the result that ﬁnancial openness increases output volatility in
high-risk countries and decreases output volatility in low-risk countries.
Over the past three decades, the number of countries in the sample having
very high or high-intermediate risk decreased. Therefore, more and more
countries may beneﬁt from ﬁnancial globalization in terms of reduced output
volatility rather than suﬀer from economic crises. This conclusion might
seem at odds with the current worldwide ﬁnancial and economic crisis. It
is not, however. Admittedly, the crisis could spread because of integrated
ﬁnancial markets, but its source was not ﬁnancial openness. The crisis was
not triggered by pro-cyclical capital ﬂows or by a ﬂight of “hot money” as was
the case in the Asian crisis. Rather, it might be speculated that the source is
mainly rooted in each of the aﬀected domestic ﬁnancial markets, but this is
29still under debate. Independently of the source, low-risk countries probably
continue to proﬁt from capital inﬂows in this crisis and should therefore not
restrict capital accounts. It will be interesting to observe to what extent the
ﬁnding of this paper is borne out in the ongoing crisis.
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34Appendix
Table 7.1: List of Countries in the Balanced Sample
26 developed countries
Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland;
France; Germany; Greece; Hong Kong; Iceland; Ireland; Israel;
Italy; Japan; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Sin-
gapore; South Africa; Spain; Sweden; Taiwan; United Kingdom;
United States
36 developing countries
Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Cameroon; Costa Rica; Dominican
Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; Haiti; Indonesia; Iran; Jamaica; Jor-
dan; Kenya; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libya; Malawi; Mexico; Mo-
rocco; Nicaragua; Pakistan; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Philip-
pines; Senegal; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Syria; Tanzania; Thailand;
Togo; Tunisia; United Arab Emirates; Zambia
Note: Singapore; Taiwan and Hong Kong are termed neither as ‘developed’
nor ‘developing’ countries. However, they belong to the group of ‘advanced’
economies as termed by the IMF and are therefore included in the group of
‘developed’ countries.
35Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean  Min Max 1980 2000
Output Volatility (Y ) 3.47 3.71 0.30 32.55 4.36 2.26
Monetary Policy () 1.89 1.35 -1.28 8.00 2.61 1.14
Fiscal Policy (Gov) -0.04 1.56 -8.43 7.79 0.35 0.03
Supply Shock (ToT) 9.14 11.78 0.00 94.77 13.13 6.28
Trade openness (TraOpen) 0.74 0.54 0.14 4.21 0.71 0.85
Financial Risk (FinRisk) 33.99 9.49 9.71 49.83 29.81 36.95
Financial openness (FinOpen) 1.88 2.05 0.26 16.23 1.28 2.68
Notes: Statistics are calculated using 310 observations for the ﬁrst columns
and 62 for the last two columns. ‘1980’ (‘2000’) is the mean of the variable in
1980-1984 (2000-2007). For deﬁnitions of the variables see Table 7.3.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table 7.4: Alternative Measure of Output Volatility

Y it = i + Qit +
PK 1
k=0 k+1FOitI(k < FRit  k+1) + K+1FOitI(K < FRit) + "it
^ 1 20.2 [20.1, 22.5]
^ 2 28.9 [26.5, 39.7]
FinOpen I(FinRisk  ^ 1) 1.537 (0.027)
FinOpen I(^ 1) < FinRisk  ^ 2) 0.223 (0.143)
FinOpen I(^ 2) < FinRisk) -0.243 (0.021)
R2[  R2] 0.39 [0.36]
Notes: The dependent variable is output volatility measured as the standard
deviation of the cyclical component of GDP, multiplied by 100.  = threshold.
FinRisk = ﬁnancial risk rating. FinOpen = ﬁnancial openness. Country
and time ﬁxed eﬀects are included. Deﬁnitions of the variables can be found
in Table 7.3. 62 countries and ﬁve 5-year non-overlapping windows are used.
1;000 bootstrap replications were used to obtain [conﬁdence intervals]. *** (**,
*) denote signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. Robust p-values are given in
parentheses.
Table 7.5: Estimation Results: Interaction Term
Y it = i + Qit + 1FinOpenit + 2FinOpenit  FinRiskit + "it
FinOpen 1.993 (0.001)
FinOpen  FinRisk -0.055 (0.001)
R2[  R2] 0.30 [0.27]
Notes: The dependent variable is output volatility. FinRisk = ﬁnancial risk
rating. FinOpen = ﬁnancial openness. Deﬁnitions of the variables can be found
in Table 7.3. 62 countries and ﬁve 5-year non-overlapping time periods are used,
leading to 310 observations. Country and time ﬁxed eﬀects are included. ***
(**, *) denote signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. Robust p-values are given
in parentheses.
38Table 7.6: Estimation Results: Excluding Income Groups
regressor double threshold triple threshold
Excluding 9 “low income” countries
FinOpen2.1/ 3.1 2.006 (0.001) 2.065 (0.001)
FinOpen2.2/ 3.2 0.464 (0.002) 0.488 (0.002)
FinOpen2.3/ 3.3 -0.177 (0.191) -0.162 (0.199)
FinOpen3.4 -0.435 (0.029)
R2[  R2] 0.42 (0.39) 0.43 [0.40]
Excluding 26 “middle income” countries
FinOpen2.1/ 3.1 1.739 (0.001) 1.914 (0.001)
FinOpen2.2/ 3.2 1.416 (0.015) 1.504 (0.010)
FinOpen2.3/ 3.3 -0.074 (0.538) -0.093 (0.475)
FinOpen3.4 -0.392 (0.087)
R2[  R2] 0.40 [0.35] 0.42 [0.37]
Excluding 27 “high income” countries
FinOpen2.1/ 3.1 1.124 (0.028) 1.206 (0.022)
FinOpen2.2/ 3.2 -0.057 (0.860) -0.014 (0.967)
FinOpen2.3/ 3.3 -1.820 (0.046) -1.719 (0.059)
FinOpen3.4 -3.092 (0.011)
R2[  R2] 0.39 [0.35] 0.40 [0.35]
Notes: The countries are divided according to their World Bank classiﬁcation:
low income, middle income and high income. The double and triple threshold
regressions, (4.2) and (5.1), are estimated leaving out one income group at a
time. If there are 30 or fewer observations in a certain risk class, the coeﬃcient
is printed in italics. Country and time ﬁxed eﬀects are included. *** (**, *)
denote signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%, 10%) percent level. Robust p-values are
given in parentheses.
39Table 7.7: Countries in Each Time Period by Class
Countries with very high ﬁnancial risk
1980: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Iran, Jamaica, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Sudan, Syria, Zambia
1985: Argentina, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Haiti, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Nicaragua,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Zambia
1990: Haiti, Lebanon, Sudan, Zambia
1995: Sudan
Countries with high-intermediate ﬁnancial risk
1980: Cameroon, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Sene-
gal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia
1985: Brazil, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico,
Morocco, Panama, Paraguay, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia
1990: Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Malawi, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal,
Sri Lanka, Syria, Tanzania, Togo
1995: Haiti, Malawi, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Zambia
2000: Argentina, Malawi, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Zambia
Countries with low-intermediate ﬁnancial risk
1980: Hong Kong, Iceland, Italy, Kuwait, Paraguay, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, United
Arab Emirates
1985: Hong Kong, Kuwait, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Thailand
1990: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Kuwait, Mexico,
Morocco, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates
1995: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
Greece, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Mo-
rocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia
2000: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic,
Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States
Countries with very low ﬁnancial risk
1980: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States
1985: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States
1990: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Iceland, In-
donesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States
1995: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Kuwait,
Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United
States
2000: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong, Iran, Japan, Kuwait, Libya, Norway, Singapore, Taiwan,
United Arab Emirates
Notes: List of countries belonging to a certain ﬁnancial risk class during a certain period. In order to
provide additional information, the low-risk class is divided into low-intermediate and very low-risk using the
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